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Summary
The incidence of cohabitation and births outside marriage in France is 
similar to that in England and Wales.  Although they have traditionally 
adopted very different approaches to family law, their response to the 
phenomenon of cohabitation has traditionally been surprisingly similar. 
In both, the law has developed piecemeal, leaving cohabitants with 
inadequate legal remedies, and the article first compares the current law 
in the two jurisdictions. However, the French government has now 
demonstrated its willingness to confront the legal needs of cohabitants. 
Proposed French legislation both acknowledges a legal status of 
cohabitation – whether heterosexual or homosexual and in addition will 
permit all unmarried cohabitants to enter into a civil union contract 
known as a PACS.  This will approximate their position more closely to 
that of married couples for all purposes, including social security 
benefits, inheritance, maintenance and property division on relationship 
breakdown.  In contrast, the British Government’s Consultation 
Document Supporting Families (1998) virtually ignores the needs of 
cohabitants focusing instead on strengthening marriage. The article goes 
on, therefore, to analyse and contrast the impact of this new divergence 
in approach between the two jurisdictions, and assesses its significance 
in the light of reforms being implemented elsewhere in Europe.
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Introduction
In both Britain and France there is evidence of restructuring away from 
marriage on a large scale, a process termed démariage by Thery (Thery 
1997).  The difficulty of making cross-cultural comparisons is 
compounded by the fact that the two jurisdictions use different methods 
for determining the extent of heterosexual cohabitation.  However, as a 
rough estimate, around one million heterosexual couples are living 
together without being married in Britain, while in France the number 
has reached two and a half million.  Nor is this merely what Kiernan has 
termed ‘nubile’ cohabitation: there has been an increase in the numbers 
cohabiting across all age categories and cohabitation is more common 
among the divorced than among those who have never married (Kiernan 
1996, Haskey 1992).  Overall, the respective national statistics show that 
one in five of all couples cohabit in France as compared with 27% of 
never-married women and 32% of divorced women between 18-49 in 
Britain (L’Insee 1998, Social Trends 1999).  Moreover, while many 
cohabiting couples go on to marry (Leridon 1990, Haskey 1997), 
cohabitation is increasingly seen as a longer-term alternative, rather than 
simply a prelude, to marriage (Lewis 1999, pp 53-55).  The lack of any 
official documentation makes it more difficult to provide a figure for the 
numbers of homosexual cohabitants.  Neither jurisdiction currently 
collects statistics on homosexual cohabitation, although it has been 
stated that the next British census, due in 2001, will seek to do so.  In 
France it is estimated that there are between a quarter and a half a 
million gay cohabiting couples who are a driving force behind the 
attempts at legislative reform (Le Nouvel Observateur, 23 August 1998). 
The significant numbers involved mean that the Napoleonic adage that 
‘cohabitants ignore the law and the law ignores them’ is no longer 
acceptable.
The current law
One would expect the two jurisdictions to approach the issue of 
cohabitation in very different ways.  The common law tends to favour 
incremental reform, dealing with particular problems on a piecemeal 
basis.  By contrast, the French civil law jurisdiction has most of its family 
law codified within the First Book of the Civil Code and lacks a formal 
system of binding precedent.  Thus a more global legislation-based 
approach to reform would be anticipated.  However, the failure of a 
number of legislative initiatives has led to France, like England, adopting 
a piecemeal approach to the issue of cohabitation.  Not only does this 
feature ad hoc legislation, under which rights similar to those granted to 
married couples are extended to (usually just heterosexual) cohabitants, 
but it also involves an active and important role being played by judge-
made law, even in the French jurisdiction. 
The most extensive reforms on both sides of the channel have occurred in 
the context of children.  To this extent an acceptance of the reality of the 
restructuring of family life away from marriage toward the heterosexual 
couple with dependent children can be observed, although a more cynical 
view might be that both Governments are more willing to impose 
obligations than to extend rights.  In both France and Britain, parents, 
regardless of their marital status, have a duty to provide financial 
support for their children (Civil Code (CC) art 334; Children Act 1989 
and Child Support Act 1991).  The inheritance rights of children are also 
unaffected by the status of their parents (CC art 757 Loi no 72-3 1972; 
Family Law Reform Act 1969, s. 15).  Joint parental responsibility has 
been automatic in France since 1993 (Loi no 93-22, art 38) and it has 
been proposed that joint registration of the birth should be sufficient to 
confer it here (LCD 1998).  The co-parenting issues that arise in the 
context of gay and lesbian couples are rather different and it has been 
noted that discrimination is still a very real issue here (Barlow 1998).   
The scope for private ordering remains contentious.  The validity of 
cohabitation contracts has not yet been established in England 
(Pawlowski 1996).  However, in the event that such a contract were 
litigated, it is likely that the courts would prefer to adopt the approach 
taken in several Commonwealth countries of declaring it valid,1 rather 
than following the older precedents, such as Upfill v Wright [1911] 1 KB 
506, that struck down such contracts on the ground of immorality.  By 
contrast, French cohabitants are entitled to enter into a contract to 
regulate their financial affairs (CC art 1134), although contracts 
attempting to regulate the personal lives of the parties are unlikely to be 
upheld (Fenouillet 1997, pp 152-3).  They may also confirm their 
eligibility to certain rights conferred under the general law by obtaining 
a certificat de concubinage (Code des Communes art L.122-26).  Most 
town halls are willing to issue such certificates to heterosexual 
cohabitants upon proof that the parties live together and a number are 
willing to grant similar certificates to same-sex couples. The effect of a 
certificate is largely symbolic in the case of the latter, as they have fewer 
rights under the general law and the certificate confers no new rights. 
Should the town hall refuse to issue the certificate, it is possible for the 
parties to make a declaration that they are living together, which, if 
1 See  Kutsenko  v Wasilenko (1959) 19 DLR (2d) 665;  Seidler  v Schallhofer [1982] 2 
NSWR 80; Kainz  v Bleiler Estate (1994) 1 RFL (4th) 188.  In addition, New Zealand, 
three Australian states and six Canadian provinces have legislated that cohabitation 
contracts should be enforceable.
signed by the parties and two witnesses, will have the same effect as the 
certificate. 
The dearth of remedies upon the breakdown of the relationship has in 
both jurisdictions led to reliance upon the general rules of property and 
contract law, which do not, in theory, take any account of the status or 
relationship of the parties.  In England the law relating to constructive 
trusts and proprietary estoppel has been developed to deal with the 
issue, while in France the concepts of the société2 and enrichissement 
sans cause3 have been applied in the domestic context.  However, it is 
difficult to agree with Willekens’s contention that the use of such 
property law and contract law techniques in both the French and English 
jurisdictions ‘has made it possible….to obtain more or less the same 
results with regard to the division of property upon family break-up as in 
family law.’ (Willekens 1998, p 56).
Three factors may be identified as posing problems for cohabiting 
couples.  First, cohabitants that discuss their respective rights tend to be 
in a better position than those who simply trust the other person. 
Secondly, evidence that contributions were made out of love and 
affection tends to be fatal to a claim, as it is assumed that this implies a 
willingness to make the contributions regardless of any expectation of an 
interest in the property (Lawson 1996, Bell et al 1998, p 413).  Thirdly, 
little weight is given to domestic contributions, as opposed to financial 
contributions or work to which a commercial value can readily be 
ascribed (Bell 1998, p 256; Labbee 1996).  Thus in both jurisdictions, 
cohabitants who exchange or reduce their labour market role for an 
unpaid domestic role receive no financial compensation from their 
partner on relationship breakdown. 
In the field of succession law cultural differences have led to a greater 
divergence between the approaches of the two jurisdictions than is to be 
observed in other areas.  In France succession is strictly controlled.  The 
major difference between the two systems is the restriction which French 
law places on freedom of testation.  A specified portion of the estate is 
reserved for lineal ascendants and descendants.  The unreserved part of 
the estate ranges from one-quarter where there are three or more 
children (CC art 913), to three-quarters where there are only ascendants 
2 This is defined in art 1832 of the Civil  Code as ‘a contract in which two or more 
persons agree to combine assets or efforts with a view toward sharing the benefits or 
savings that may result.  The partners are bound to contribute to losses’.
3  This concept translates literally to ‘unjust enrichment’.  It has been developed by case 
law but it is a fairly narrow window of opportunity.  It has however, been successfully 
applied in the family law context as in the decision of the Court of Cassation in Civ. (1) 
26.10.82,  JCP 1983, II, 1992 note Terré.  Here an anaesthetic nurse who for 10 years 
worked unpaid in her professional  capacity for her surgeon husband whom she had 
married under a separate property regime, succeeded in her claim of  enrichissement 
sans cause.  These services were found to go beyond those charges du mariage required 
of spouses under Art. 214 C.C.  If founded such a claim will give rise to a personal right 
of  indemnity  rather  than  a  right  in  property  as  would  be  the  case  in  respect  of  a 
constructive trust in the English jurisdiction.
in either the paternal or maternal line (CC art 914). Thus the ability of a 
cohabitant to make provision for his or her partner is limited where there 
are surviving relatives or children.  Moreover, high rates of tax apply to 
such gifts: any amount over 10,000F will be taxed at 60%.  By contrast, 
in England there exist no such limitations on testamentary freedom and a 
cohabitant is free to make a will leaving everything to his or her partner. 
It is also possible for a cohabitant to make a claim for provision even if no 
provision was made.  ‘Reasonable financial provision’ may, at the 
discretion of the court, be awarded to a heterosexual cohabitant that has 
been living with the deceased for two years (Inheritance (Provision for 
Family and Dependants) Act 1975 ss 1(1)(ba) and (1A), inserted by Law 
Reform (Succession) Act 1995 s. 2).  A person who was ‘dependent’ upon 
the deceased may also claim (Inheritance (Provision for Family and 
Dependants) Act 1975, s. 1(1)(e)).4
By contrast, France has been more generous in extending social security 
rights to cohabiting couples.  Both heterosexual and homosexual 
cohabitants are entitled to rely upon one another’s contributions for the 
purposes of sickness and maternity benefits (Loi no 78-2 art 13 and Loi 
no 93-121, art 78 respectively).  In England there is no such status-based 
entitlement to contributory benefits outside marriage.  Moreover, 
heterosexual cohabitation will be taken into account in assessing 
eligibility for means-tested benefits – thus imposing a dual penalty upon 
them (Barlow 1997, ch 4). 
Thus the law in both jurisdictions takes the form of a tiered system, 
although the tiers are not entirely consistent.  In some contexts a three-
tiered system may be observed, with decreasing rights being accorded to 
married couples, heterosexual cohabitants and homosexual cohabitants 
in turn.  In other areas there are only two tiers, although this may be 
either because heterosexual cohabitants are being equated to married 
couples or because they are treated in the same way as homosexual 
cohabitants.  Thus, despite the fact that new rights have been accorded 
to cohabitants in the past few years, the piecemeal and sometimes 
incoherent nature of these rights mean that it is not possible to talk of a 
‘status’ of cohabitation (Fenouillet, p 149).
Proposals for reform
The inconsistencies and inadequacies of the law relating to heterosexual 
and homosexual cohabitants are apparent in both jurisdictions.  However, 
the similarities in the legal position of cohabitants mask very different 
political agendas despite the fact that left-wing Governments not known 
for championing traditional family values have recently been elected in 
both jurisdictions.  
The Law Commission for England and Wales has, for the past seven 
4 For the meaning of ‘dependency’ in this context see Jelley v Iliffe [1981] Fam 128 and 
Bishop v Plumley [1991] 1 All ER 236, c.f. Re Watson (Deceased) [1999] 1 FLR 878.  
years, been examining the property rights of all persons who share a 
home, including married couples, cohabitants, relations and friends (Law 
Commission 1993, para 2.40, Harpum 1995).  The need for reform has 
been endorsed by a number of interest groups (Thompson 1996) and 
numerous proposals for reform have been advanced by academics. 
Members of the judiciary have added their voice to this, emphasising at 
the same time that reform is a matter for Parliament rather than the 
courts.  However, with the exception of a Theresa Gorman’s 1991 
Cohabitation (Contract Enforcement) Bill, the issue of reform of the law 
relating to cohabitation has not found its way onto Parliament’s agenda. 
The fact that the recent consultation document, Supporting Families, 
(Home Office, 1998) makes little reference to the particular needs of 
cohabiting couples, and none to the work of the Law Commission in this 
area, would also seem to suggest that reform of ‘cohabitation law’ is not 
a priority for the Government.  Whilst it espouses a rhetoric of neutrality, 
and on one level claims that intervention aims to help the parenting 
relationship, whether married or not, to succeed, New Labour’s focus for 
family policy is one which still clings to the ideal of ‘strengthening 
marriage’. Chapter 4 of the Green Paper is devoted to this very pursuit, 
para 4.12 of which states:
“Marriage does provide a strong foundation for stability for the 
care of children.  It also sets out rights and responsibilities for all 
concerned.  It remains the choice of the majority of people in 
Britain.  For all these reasons, it makes sense for the Government 
to do what it can to strengthen marriage.”
The paper, dubbed by some the ‘the Government’s Make’em Marry 
Crusade’ (Campbell 1998), proposes a number of measures to strengthen 
marriage, whilst barely mentioning other family forms.  This approach, 
however, displays a wilful blindness to the fact that an increasing 
percentage of the population, which is cohabiting outside marriage, is 
being left in a complex legal wilderness.  A number of measures to 
strengthen marriage, including better marriage preparation, a clear 
statement of rights and responsibilities for married couples, prenuptial 
agreements and access to counselling and mediation when difficulties 
arise, are envisaged (ch 4).  Yet the sole concession in the paper to the 
existence of the cohabiting family per se is the rather grudging 
suggestion that ‘it might be worthwhile’ producing a guide for 
cohabitants, setting out their legal rights in relation to income, property, 
tax, welfare benefits and children (para 4.8).  The guide, if produced, 
would be available in libraries and Citizens’ Advice Bureaux.  But this 
clearly would do little to address the complexity and inadequacies of the 
law relating to cohabitation.
By contrast, in France the issue of the legal status of cohabitants has 
been brought before Parliament numerous times over the last seven 
years.  However, there has been a divergence of opinion as to when and 
how such a legal status should arise. The first Bill to be debated in the 
National Assembly concerned a contrat d’union civile (No 3066 25th 
November 1992).  This involved an opt-in regime.  The relationship 
created by entering into a contract would have lasted for a minimum of 
six months and required the parties to offer each other secours et 
assistance.  It would also have imposed a regime of community of 
property on acquests and conferred parental authority on both parties. 
While this last proposal has become law in the meantime, commitment to 
some of the other ideas seems to have waned in subsequent attempts to 
introduce legislation.
The Government has now endorsed the need for reform.  It announced on 
27 June 1996 that a study of the issue would be undertaken.  Following 
the issue of the Hauser report (Hauser 1998),5 legislation on the pacte 
civil de solidarite (PACS) was introduced in October 1998.  The first 
attempt at reform failed.  However, the legislation was reintroduced and 
passed its first reading in the National Assembly on 9 December 1998 by 
316 votes to 249, with voting patterns splitting along a broad left-right 
axis.
The Senate, which is dominated by right wing groups, did not agree with 
this approach.  The report by the Commission of Finances argued that 
PACS would cost too much and was based on confused values (Marini, 
1998-9).  The Senate accordingly decided to take a more inclusive 
approach and to confer a more limited range of rights upon all cohabiting 
couples (Proposition de loi, modifiée par le Senat, relative au mariage, au 
concubinage et aux liens de solidarité, text adopted no 100, 23 March 
1999).  This essentially involved the assertion of the validity of 
cohabitation contracts (art 1(C)) and certain tax concessions for 
dependants (art 2 and art 3(bis)) and nominated persons (art 3).  The Bill 
also defined cohabitation as ‘the fact of two persons living together as a 
couple without being married’ (Art 1(C)).  In view of the limited range of 
rights envisaged by the Bill, this definition may at first sight seem a little 
superfluous.  However, it was intended that it should be inserted in the 
Civil Code as the standard definition of cohabitation for the purposes of 
existing rules, which would eliminate many of the discrepancies between 
heterosexual and homosexual cohabitants.
The National Assembly refused to be swayed from its plans for reform. 
Barely a fortnight after the first reading of the draft legislation in the 
Senate, the National Assembly gave a second reading to a version that 
bore little evidence of the Senate’s modifications, by a slightly narrower 
margin of 300 votes to 253.6
5The Committee appointed by the Minister of Justice to study the financial implications 
of the separation of couples was chaired by Professor Jean Hauser, of the Universite 
Montesquieu, Bordeaux IV, and comprised 8 professionals, the majority of whom were 
academic or practising lawyers.
6 Proposition de loi adoptée avec modifications par l’Assemblée Nationale en deuxième 
lecture, relative au pacte civil de solidarité [text adopted no 278, 7 April 1999].  Text 
available on <http://www.assemblee-nationale.fr/2/dossiers/pacs/ta0278.htm>. 
The final text provides that two adults, of the same or opposite sex, may 
enter into a pacte civil as long as they are neither related to one another 
nor already linked to another person by a marriage or pacte (Art 1er, 
proposed art 515-2 CC).  The parties are required to draw up a written 
agreement together and submit it to the clerk of the local magistrates’ 
court for registration (proposed art 515-3 CC).  The clerk must also be 
notified of any subsequent modifications to the agreement.  A pacte may 
be terminated in a number of ways.  Consistently with the insistence that 
‘a pacte is not a marriage’, there is no requirement that the parties go 
through the procedure of a divorce.  There is no minimum duration for a 
pacte, although where only one of the parties wishes to bring it to an end 
it will subsist for three months after a declaration to this effect.  A joint 
declaration by the parties or the marriage or death of either of the 
partners automatically terminates the pacte (proposed art 515-8 CC).
The content of the agreement is left up to the parties, although there are 
certain guidelines.  The parties are entitled to determine the form of the 
‘mutual and material assistance’ that they are required to offer one 
another (proposed art 515-4 CC).  Both parties are jointly liable for any 
debts contracted by one of them for their daily needs or household 
expenses (proposed art 515-4 CC).  Property acquired during the 
relationship is generally to be held jointly7 but the parties are entitled to 
make alternative arrangements (proposed art 515-5 CC). In determining 
the consequences of the breakdown of the relationship, the onus is again 
placed upon the parties themselves, although if they cannot agree the 
matter will be referred to a judge (proposed art 515-8 CC).  It is unclear 
whether this confers discretion upon the courts or whether it simply 
allows the shares of the parties to be determined in accordance with 
their strict property rights.
The legislation deals with the public law consequences of entering into a 
pacte in rather more detail.  Entitlement to certain benefits is guaranteed 
simply by entering into a pacte.  These include social security benefits 
(art 4bis) and the right to succeed to a tenancy in the name of a partner 
who has either deserted the home or is deceased (art 9).  However, 
eligibility to other rights will depend in addition upon the duration of the 
pacte.  The parties must generally have been linked by a pacte for two 
years before they are entitled to benefit from the more generous 
provisions relating to the taxation of inter vivos gifts or legacies (art 3).8 
Joint taxation for the purposes of income tax only occurs after the third 
anniversary of registration (art 2). 
The National Assembly did make two substantive changes in the course 
7 The form of ownership is  indivision, which is governed by art 815 CC and roughly 
corresponds to the concept of the tenancy in common in English law: see R. Dyson, 
French Real Property and Succession Law (Robert Hale Ltd, 1988), ch. 9. 
8 This provides that the first 300,000F will not be taxed.  The next 100,000F will be 
taxed at 40% and any sums above this at 50%. Exceptions to the time periods may be 
made for couples who have a long-standing relationship but who have only recently 
entered into a pacte.
of the second reading.  The first can be seen as an acknowledgement of 
the views of the Senate in that a definition of concubinage has been 
retained (art 1(ter), proposed art 515-8 CC).  A number of differences in 
the way in which this is defined should be noted.  There is no longer any 
reference to the fact that the parties have not married: the term union de 
fait (de facto union) is adopted instead.  The new definition also makes it 
explicit that the de facto union may exist between a couple of the same or 
opposite sex.  However, it is no longer sufficient for the parties simply to 
live together: their relationship must present ‘un caractère de stabilité et 
de continuité’.  Interestingly, the consequential amendments contained in 
this version of the Bill, which primarily affect social security, tax and 
employment legislation, aim to standardise legislative references to 
cohabitation in line with the definition of concubinage set out in the 
proposed art 515-8 CC.  Thus, in addition to amending legislation to give 
rights to couples who are pacsé, phrases which define cohabitation with 
reference to marriage such as ‘qui vit maritalement’ (living together as 
husband and wife), have been uniformly replaced by the phrase ‘qui vit 
en concubinage’ (e.g. arts 4(bis), 5(bis) & (ter)).
The second change concerns the position of relations.  In this case the 
National Assembly has directly rejected ideas put forward by the Senate. 
The original draft passed by the National Assembly envisaged that the 
provisions relating to tax and succession to tenancies would be extended 
to two siblings who share a home.  The Senate took this idea a stage 
further.  Its proposals were intended to confer as many fiscal rights upon 
relations as upon cohabitants.  There were obvious similarities between 
this approach and the inclusive concept of ‘home-sharing’ upon which the 
Law Commission’s project is premised (Harpum 1995).  However, in the 
new draft adopted by the National Assembly, no mention is made of the 
position of siblings or other family members.  Thus the focus has shifted 
subtly away from home-sharing towards the regulation of adult sexuality.
It should be noted that this final draft is weaker than earlier attempts at 
reform.  Although the substance of the formal requirements have 
remained more or less constant, the current draft gives the task of 
supervision and registration to the clerk of the magistrates’ court rather 
than the prefecture or officer d’etat civile.  Other analogies with 
marriage have also been whittled away.  The parties owe one another 
mutual and material assistance, rather than the secours et assistance 
required of spouses and suggested in the original contrat d’union civile. 
Community of acquests has been replaced by l’indivision and the 
succession rights of the parties are still considerably less than their 
married counterparts.  There is no mention of the children of the 
relationship.  The proposals combine State recognition and registration 
with a considerable degree of freedom for the parties to arrange their 
affairs as they wish.  
The National Assembly’s proposals have been criticised by both the left 
(Le Monde 27.1.99) and the right.  Religious and right wing groups 
marched in protest in Paris on 31st January 1999 (Le Monde, 31.1.1999). 
It will be necessary for the draft legislation to be considered by the 
Senate one more time.  Even if they continue to oppose the concept of 
PACS, it is still possible for the National Assembly to force legislation 
through by giving it a third reading.9  Thus, bearing in mind the fact that 
the National Assembly has so far shown itself unwilling to accommodate 
the views of the Senate, it is likely that reform will be in the form 
described above. 
Plus ça change?
Clearly, the French government is willing to engage with the issue of 
cohabitation outside marriage and instigate legislative reform, in a way 
that the British government is not.  It might be argued that this merely 
reflects the fact that cohabitation is less prevalent in England and Wales 
and that the critical mass necessary for reform has not yet been 
established.  It might also reflect the fact that France began the process 
of extending rights to cohabiting couples at an earlier stage (Glendon 
1977, pp 83-91). Alternatively, there may be real differences of substance 
between the two countries that affect the reform process.  In order to 
evaluate the proposed reforms in France and the possibility that this 
jurisdiction might take a similar route, this final section will analyse their 
respective approaches against the background of similar reforms in a 
wider range of jurisdictions. 
Recognition
In the past, two distinct trends in the definition of cohabitation could be 
observed.  The claims of heterosexual couples to particular rights were 
strengthened by an analogy with their situation and that of married 
couples.  By contrast, if legislation extended rights to homosexual 
couples, it rarely did so explicitly, preferring to adopt more general, de-
sexualised terms. Both trends showed deference to marriage, the former 
in limiting claims to those whose relationship was sufficiently similar to 
marriage, the latter in refusing to draw such an analogy in the case of 
those who were not entitled to marry. 
In recent years this dichotomy has broken down in a number of 
jurisdictions, with rights being extended to heterosexual cohabitants on 
the basis of more neutral criteria, the explicit recognition of homosexual 
cohabitants and even, in certain cases, the application of the marriage-
model to homosexual cohabitants.  The draft legislation in France is an 
example of the first two of these practices.  It may be questioned whether 
9 In fact the Senate refused to undertake another reading of the Bill scheduled for 5 
May 1999. Instead on the 11 May 1999, they requested that the Bill be examined by a 
joint committee of both houses. This request was refused and the final reading of the 
Bill will now take place in the National Assembly on the 30 June 1999.
the fact that the definition of concubinage has been shorn of all reference 
to marriage is due to a residual reluctance to apply the terminology of 
marriage to same-sex couples.  A more positive way of regarding it is that 
the simple concept of coupledom amounts to a formal recognition of 
cohabitation – whether between couples of the same or opposite sex – as 
a valid family form.10
By contrast, English legislation remains firmly wedded to the marriage-
model in defining cohabitation.  This may be illustrated by two recent 
pieces of legislation.  The Law Reform (Succession) Act 1995 and the 
Family Law Act 1996, both products of the recommendations of the Law 
Commission, adopted this model while implying that cohabitation was 
inferior to marriage.  In the 1995 Act this was implied by the 
requirement that a cohabitant should have lived with the deceased as 
their spouse for at least two years before making a claim for reasonable 
financial provision: s 1(1)(ba). The definition of cohabitants in the Family 
Law Act 1996 s 62(1)(a) as ‘a man and a woman who, although not 
married to each other, are living together as husband and wife’ seems 
somewhat grudging, conveying the impression that they should be 
married to one another.  Just in case this was not sufficiently clear, right-
wing groups forced an amendment during the passage of the Act that 
would require judges to ‘have regard to the fact that [cohabitants] have 
not given each other the commitment involved in marriage’: s 41. 
The definitions allowing homosexual couples to make claims for 
protection from domestic violence or for reasonable financial provision 
on divorce are also de-sexualised.  Under the Family Law Act, s 62(3)(c) 
any person who lives or has lived ‘in the same household’ is an associated 
person and as such entitled to claim a non-molestation order (s 42). 
However, only married couples, cohabitants, or those entitled to an 
interest in the house may make a claim for an occupation order (s 33) 
(Lind and Barlow 1995).  Reasonable financial provision may be awarded 
to ‘dependants’ under the Inheritance (Provision for Family and 
Dependants) Act 1975, s 1(1)(e).  Thus Parliament has yet to confront an 
overt extension of rights to gay cohabitants.11  This approach is echoed in 
the courts, with the Court of Appeal decision in Fitzpatrick v Sterling 
[1998] Ch 30412 that homosexual cohabitants are neither living together 
10 The link between recognition and regulation should not, however, be overlooked: see 
F. Gaudu, ‘A propos du “contrat d’union civile”: critique d’un profane’ (1998)  Recueil 
Dalloz, 2nd Cahier, p 19.  Similar arguments have been advanced by D. Bradley in the 
context of Sweden, see Family Law and Political Culture (Sweet & Maxwell, 1996).
11 Outside Parliament, immigration rights have been extended to homosexual couples 
under a concession.  The rules are tucked away in annex z of ch 8 of the Immigration 
Directorate’s Instructions.  Even so, there does seem to be a reluctance to include the 
words ‘homosexual’ and marriage’ on the same page.  The marriage-model applies in 
that the couple must have been ‘living together in a relationship akin to marriage which 
has subsisted for four or more years’.  However, while same-sex couples are obviously 
included within the requirement  that  the parties  are  legally  unable  to  marry under 
English law, they are not its sole object.  For a discussion of this, see Barlow et al, 
Advising Gay and Lesbian Clients: A Guide for Lawyers (Butterworths, 1999), ch 6.
12 An appeal to the House of Lords was concluded on 13 April 1999 where judgment 
as husband and wife nor members of one another’s families.  
Thus there is neither an acceptance of cohabitation as an independent 
family form nor any recognition that homosexual couples may be 
cohabitants.  Nor does it seem that this is likely to change in the near 
future.  The Law Commission’s concept of ‘home-sharers’ follows the 
pattern identified above in being over-inclusive and evasive at the same 
time.  All those who share a home are included regardless of their 
relationship, but the concept does not identify why the mere fact of 
sharing a roof should be the trigger for rights.  Moreover, its scope will 
depend on the way in which ‘home’ is defined.  The origins of the project 
in the deficiencies of the law relating to constructive trusts raise a 
suspicion that only the owner-occupied home is being considered.  In the 
light of evidence that cohabitants across all social classes are more likely 
to rent than to buy a house together, (DETR 1998, pp 97-8) to focus 
exclusively on the owner-occupied family home will not achieve a code 
for cohabitants as a whole.  Indeed, given that the Family Law Act now 
permits the transfer of a tenancy of the family home on relationship 
breakdown as between heterosexual but not same-sex cohabitants 
(Family Law Act 1996, Schedule 7), the introduction of remedies for all 
owner-occupier homesharer-cohabitants would create yet further 
anomalies in the law.  Similar criticisms may be levelled at Supporting 
Families, which focuses on parenting rather than marriage or 
cohabitation in the context of tax and social security.  However, it is 
exclusive in that it does not mention same-sex couples at all.
In searching for reasons for the recent divergence in their response to 
broadly similar demographic trends in Britain and France, the inherent 
differences in the underpinning philosophies of a civilian as opposed to a 
common law legal system may provide some insight.  The French have 
been attempting to effect global reform of the law relating to cohabitants 
since 1991.  Earlier reforms achieved by a combination of case law and 
piecemeal legislation in that jurisdiction have not been accepted as 
sufficient by politicians and pressure groups alike.  This is the case even 
though, as we have seen, rights have been extended to both heterosexual 
and same-sex couples in this way.  Only global reform formally amending 
the Civil Code and acknowledging a legal status for all cohabitants would 
be satisfactory from the legal intellectual standpoint.  This view is nicely 
illustrated by the Hauser Committee in their second report:
“Judicial  decision-making  has  encountered  difficulties  in  its 
treatment of different situations arising out of living together (la 
vie  en commun) and would not be capable of responding to the 
central  question  of  conceding  rights  and  of  putting  it  beyond 
dispute.   To  legislate  a  priori is  to  go  from a  factual  situation 
regulated at the margins and retrospectively by case law into a law-
based situation regulated globally by statute.” (p 1, translated by 
the authors).
was reserved.
The latter position has come to be regarded as the most satisfactory, 
despite the traditional position of not legislating to retain the legal 
monopoly of marriage.  Thus whereas common law jurisdictions regard 
situations regulated retrospectively by case law as the normal course of 
events, the legal treatment of cohabitation in this way was exceptional in 
the eyes of the codified French jurisdiction.  Once the numbers of people 
affected by the inconsistencies and inadequacies in the law made it 
politically inappropriate if not irresponsible for the law to continue to 
ignore cohabitants, the idea of global legislative reform of the Civil Code 
was embraced.  One can of course point to the greater numbers of 
cohabitants in France and the more active lobbying of the French gay 
rights movement on this particular issue, as reasons why France has 
confronted this issue more readily than in Britain.  However, their 
persistence with an attempt to create a formal legal status for unmarried 
couples in the face of vociferous opposition of the Church and the 
political right (Boutin 1998), can also be seen to be driven by a stronger 
intellectual desire for legislative cohesion than would ever be found in 
England.  This might also offer some explanation why global reform has 
been achieved in other European countries with far lower levels of 
cohabitation than in Britain, such as Belgium and the Spanish provinces 
of Aragon and Catalonia.  A difference in legal culture of this kind 
combined with the type of constitutional rights offered to citizens also 
impacts upon the strategies of those campaigning for reform.  Thus 
seeking concessions on an issue by issue basis may be accepted as the 
most effective strategy in England, whereas a campaign for global reform 
may have a more realistic chance for success in a civilian jurisdiction.  It 
remains to be seen whether the implementation of the Human Rights Act 
1998 will have any effect on the English approach to such issues.
Freedom or imposition 
The issue as to whether rights should be extended only to those who take 
some affirmative action or should be imposed on all those who meet 
certain criteria is one that has been debated many times (Deech 1980; 
Freeman 1984; Bailey-Harris 1996). In the debate inevitably centred on 
the question as to whether rights should be conferred on cohabitants at 
all, as the only means of opting in was to marry.  Now more and more 
jurisdictions are choosing to create a new institution that offers a half-
way house between marriage and cohabitation, despite the argument 
that such an approach, allowing couples to opt into a new institution, 
represents more of a threat to marriage than the extension of rights to 
cohabitants (Leveneur 1998).  The fact that the National Assembly has 
chosen to follow this route is indicative of the influence that the concept 
of union libre has on the French psyche.
However, objections to this approach have been voiced.  First, it may be 
questioned whether cohabiting couples will be willing to enter into a 
pacte.  It might be argued that an opt-in system would work in France 
because of the existing system of obtaining a declaration of cohabitation. 
However, only 38% of heterosexual couples currently obtain such a 
declaration.  This figure would seem to throw doubt upon the survey of 
cohabitants claiming that 57% would be interested in entering into a 
pacte giving them rights similar to those of married couples.  On the 
other hand, it should be borne in mind that obtaining a declaration of 
cohabitation does not secure any greater rights for couples and that the 
fiscal advantages of a pacte may overcome reluctance to formalise the 
cohabiting relationship.
It has also been asserted that in practice only homosexual couples will 
bother to register a pacte, since heterosexual couples have the option of 
marrying.  The evidence from the Netherlands suggests that there are a 
number of heterosexual couples who cohabit because of ideological 
objections to marriage but who are willing to express their commitment 
for one another in a different way.  In 1998 1,550 heterosexual couples 
registered a partnership, more than the number of registrations by 
lesbian couples during the same period (Waaldijk 1999a).  The low take-
up of registered partnerships in both the Netherlands and Scandinavia 
(Lund-Anderson 1998; Eekelaar 1998) could be taken to suggest that 
many same-sex couples are not interested in formalising their 
relationship.  However, once again the analogy between PACS and 
existing systems is not perfect.  The more extensive rights and, at least in 
Scandinavia, greater restriction on leaving a partnership mean that the 
take-up of registered partnerships is only of limited use in predicting the 
possible response to PACS.
In the event that all cohabiting couples entered into a pacte, there would 
be a neat two-tiered system.  The second objection to PACS is based on 
the fact that this is unlikely to occur and the proposed reforms would 
have the effect of proliferating the categories of cohabitant recognised by 
the law, with each being accorded a different legal status.  A four-tiered 
system of regulation will result, with different rights being accorded to 
married or pacsé couples, heterosexual cohabitants and same-sex 
cohabitants.  The force of this criticism has been blunted since the 
National Assembly gave the Bill its first reading last December.  The 
definition of cohabitation in the new draft will eliminate many of the 
distinctions between the treatment of heterosexual and homosexual 
cohabitants.  Thus while the system will still be multi-tiered, it will be no 
more complex than that currently in operation.  It would also be more 
logical in terms of rights being extended to couples in proportion to their 
willingness to formalise their relationship.
The final criticism that has been levelled at PACS is that it may not 
protect the most needy.  The couples who are willing to enter into a pacte 
will not necessarily be those who need assistance in determining their 
property rights when the relationship has broken down.  Moreover, even 
where a couple does enter into a pacte, one party may be in a weaker 
bargaining position, whether by reason of lack of finances or because he 
or she is dominated by the other party.  In such a case the emphasis 
placed upon the private resolution of property rights and duties will 
operate to the detriment of that person.  These criticisms have some 
force.  They represent the most intractable problem for would-be 
reformers in this area, namely what approach should be taken where one 
party does not want to assume the obligations that are needed for the 
protection of the other.  
Those who have discussed the appropriate mechanism for reform in this 
area from either the libertarian or protectionist point of view have tended 
to discuss cohabitants as if they are a homogenous group with 
identifiable wishes.  This is hardly the case.  As a broad generalisation, 
three main groups may be identified: those who both want rights, those 
where neither want rights and those where one wants rights and the 
other does not.  An opt-in regime works well for couples who are agreed 
that neither or both of them are willing to assume rights and 
responsibilities.  These problems are not solved if a more inclusive 
regime is adopted.  If obligations are imposed on persons despite the fact 
that they have taken no positive action, the issue shifts to the extent to 
which they should be allowed to opt out.  Should opting-out only be 
allowed where both parties agree or should anyone be entitled to evade 
responsibilities in this way?  It should be borne in mind that a reluctance 
to assume the rights and responsibilities associated with marriage is not 
the same as an ideological objection to marriage.  This distinction may be 
illustrated by the registration of partnerships by heterosexual couples in 
the Netherlands, despite the fact that this gives the parties practically 
the same rights as if they were married.
The division of opinion on this point is likely to continue.  It should, 
however, be noted that the force of this ground of objection may again 
have been dulled by recent developments.  If the passage of legislation 
allowing couples to enter into a pacte was seen as precluding the need 
for future reform relating to cohabitation, then it might operate to the 
disadvantage of cohabiting couples who did not wish to enter into such 
an arrangement.  While they would be no worse off than under the 
present law, the legislative changes that might have ameliorated their 
position would not be passed.  However, the inclusion of a definition of 
cohabitation in the Civil Code seems to suggest that PACS will not be 
seen as a substitute for future reform.  This definition is thus not only a 
means of ensuring that same-sex cohabitants will be entitled to the same 
rights as their heterosexual counterparts currently enjoy but may also be 
used as a springboard for future legal and social developments. 
Anderson has argued that ‘registered personal relationships’ might be a 
viable model for reform England and Wales, describing them as ‘one 
realistic, secular legal answer to modern trends… [that] would also 
provide options for people actively to take control of their lives.’ 
(Anderson 1997, p 176). However, she does not consider the problem that 
many cohabitants are unaware of the necessity of taking control of their 
lives in this way. The lack of any notarial tradition and the fact that the 
validity of cohabitation contracts has still not been established has meant 
that cohabiting couples have little experience of formalising their 
relationship.  The prevalence of disputes over the family home also 
indicates that few are aware of the need to regulate their property rights 
by making a declaration of the beneficial interests in the family home. 
This lack of awareness of legal rights may in part be due to the still 
prevalent belief in the existence of common law marriage (McRae 1993), 
despite the fact that this concept was abolished in 1753.  Common-law 
marriage is conceptually very different from union libre.  The latter 
conveys an impression of freedom from responsibility, implying also that 
this is the result of a deliberate choice.  The former implies that 
‘common-law spouses’ will be awarded the same rights as married 
couples after a certain period of time without any affirmative action 
being needed by the parties, although ironically even some of the forms 
of common-law marriage that existed before 1753 required some 
affirmative action (Stone 1992; Outhwaite 1995). 
The fact that a reform requiring positive action by the parties is unlikely 
to succeed in England and Wales does pose certain problems for those 
contemplating reform.  It places a heavy onus on the definition of 
cohabitation.  While it may be acceptable to confer rights upon a couple 
that have entered into a pacte on the very day that they begin living 
together, some greater evidence of the stability of the relationship will be 
needed where rights are imposed by the state.  Presumably the Law 
Commission intends to qualify its concept of ‘home-sharers’ to reflect this 
problem.
Public v private
The willingness of the respective Governments to address the public and 
private law rights of cohabiting couples should also be compared.  In 
France the focus is on the public law rights that are to be awarded to 
couples upon registration of a pacte.  These rights can be seen as a 
means of encouraging couples to enter into such arrangements.  The 
parameters of the parties’ obligations inter se are stated broadly, giving 
them a considerable degree of freedom to arrange their affairs as they 
wish.  Again, this reflects the respect accorded to the union libre as well 
as a different concept of the role of the State in securing provision for its 
members.  
In England and Wales it is unlikely that such incentives will be enacted. 
The trend has been to achieve equality between married and unmarried 
couples by reducing the advantages of both.  Thus the married couple’s 
tax allowance, payable whether or not a married couple had dependant 
children, has been abolished and replaced with a combination of an 
increase in Child Benefit (implemented April 1999) and a Working 
Families Tax Credit (to be implemented November 1999).  Both are 
aimed only at parents with dependant children but take no account of 
marital status.  Some contributory welfare benefits which traditionally 
provided an additional allowance for dependant spouses but not for 
cohabitants, have removed the spousal allowance altogether.13  In the 
case of the state retirement pension, however, the spousal allowance is 
retained although its extension to even heterosexual cohabitants is 
certainly not on the political agenda.  The Law Commission is focusing on 
the private law rights of cohabitants.  Yet the reaction to the Family 
Homes and Domestic Violence Bill 1995 indicates that this will not be an 
easy task.  There were virulent protests in the media because of the 
mistaken perception that it extended property rights to cohabiting 
couples.14  It was withdrawn shortly before its third and final reading in 
the Commons, although its provisions, subject to some pro-marriage 
modifications, were subsequently enacted as Part IV of the Family Law 
Act 1996.  The trends outlined above suggest some reasons for this 
resentment of the conferral of property rights upon cohabiting couples. 
If the State is to impose rights and obligations upon couples, some 
corresponding advantage may be expected by those who bear the brunt 
of those obligations.  To impose obligations without advantages – whether 
this are fiscal or psychological – is to incur the risk of resentment already 
graphically displayed in public reactions to other efforts to deal with the 
issue of family restructuring. 
Conclusion
Thus in neither jurisdiction is the reform process as global as family 
restructuring demands.  The above discussion indicates that the objective 
of reform may be more easily achieved in France, partly because of 
Governmental support for the project and partly because of the different 
cultural factors.  Whilst in France, they have at least addressed the legal 
status of cohabitants, which could provide an appropriate platform for 
future reform, the current proposals confer few substantive rights.  In 
England, on the other hand, heterosexual if not same-sex cohabitants 
may have made greater gains in terms of substantive private law rights. 
Part IV Family Law Act 1996, for example, gives all cohabitants the right 
to apply for non-molestation orders and all heterosexual and some same-
sex cohabitants the right to apply for occupation orders in respect of the 
family home.  Heterosexual cohabitants are now recognised as a formal 
category of applicant who may seek provision from the estate of their 
deceased partner and same-sex dependant cohabitants have a similar 
right.  Nonetheless, cohabitants still lack a formal legal status.
13 This occurred for example when sickness benefit was replaced by statutory sick pay 
(Statutory Sick Pay Act 1991) and unemployment benefit was replaced by jobseeker’s 
allowance (Jobseekers Act 1995).
14 The Bill  was actually a consolidating measure: the provisions to which the media 
took  exception  had  been  law  since  the  passage  of  the  Domestic  Violence  and 
Matrimonial Proceedings Act 1976.
It should also be noted that reform has been secured in other 
jurisdictions.  No longer are the Scandinavian countries the sole 
jurisdictions to have addressed the issue of cohabitation.  The 
Netherlands has created a registered partnership that is open to 
heterosexual and homosexual couples alike under the Registered 
Partnerships Act 1998 and has decided to extend the right to marry to 
same-sex couples (Waaldijk 1999b).  Legislation relating to cohabitation 
légale was passed in Belgium in 1998. Even in Spain, a jurisdiction more 
noted for its traditional family structures than its radicalism, Aragon and 
Catalonia have enacted reform.  Thus changes in the laws relating to 
cohabitants are to be observed across Europe.  Despite both France and 
Britain having traditionally preferred to allow the legal monopoly and 
privileging of marriage to dominate their approach to legal reform, 
Britain appears now to be alone in believing that strengthening marriage 
and denying the validity of other family forms is the better route to social 
inclusion.  How attractive Pacs will prove to be in practice in France 
remains to be seen.  However the adoption of a safety-net definition of 
concubinage in the Civil Code combined with the possibility of Pacs may 
well have avoided many of the difficulties posed by opting either for an 
inclusive or for an exclusive approach.  Perhaps this combination will 
mean that the adage ‘Plus ça change, plus c’est la même chose’ may not 
be entirely apt, at least in the French context.
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